News Publication Date: 19 August 2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE ISLE OF MAN
CIVIL DIVISION
CHANCERY PROCEDURE
The Financial Supervision Commission Claimant
And
(1) Ian Darroch
(2) Christina Letham Dirom
(3) Andrew Darroch
(4) Tracy-Ann Hughes Defendants
Judgment Summary issued by the High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man
This summary is provided to assist in understanding the judgment of the court. It does not form part of the judgment. The judgment itself is the only authoritative document. The full judgment is available at www.judgments.im.
On the 17 August 2011 His Honour Deemster Doyle First Deemster and Clerk of the Rolls sitting in the High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man Civil Division Chancery Procedure delivered a judgment which upheld challenges lodged by the First and Second Defendants to the preliminary grants of permission to the Claimant pursuant to section 3(3) of the Company Officers (Disqualification) Act 2009 to bring proceedings outwith the ordinarily applicable two year time limit relevant to such proceedings.
The First Deemster was not persuaded that there was any good reason for the significant delay in commencing proceedings for disqualification orders against the Defendants.
The First Deemster stated:
'44. Tynwald has enacted a 2 year statutory time limit within which claims for disqualification orders must be made. The 2 year statutory time limit is a requirement of the law. The Claimant like every other legal entity is subject to the law of the land. The court can grant leave for proceedings for disqualification orders to be made after the expiration of the 2 year statutory time limit ... The discretion whether or not to permit the Claimant leave to proceed out of time is ... a discretion of the court not a discretion of the Claimant. Such discretion must be exercised judicially. Exceptional circumstances need to exist before such discretion can be exercised in favour of the Claimant. There has to be good reason for the delay and the delay must be properly and fully explained. I am not satisfied that this is an exceptional case in which the court should exercise its discretion in favour of the Claimant. I am not satisfied that the delay has been properly and fully explained. I am not satisfied that there are good reasons for the delay.'